By Bécquer Medak-Seguín
January 2010
A disconcerting logic in United States–fashioned rhetoric regarding Latin America has taken command in recent weeks, following the elections of so-called center-right or right-wing candidates in Chile (Sebastián Piñera), Panama (Ricardo Martinelli), and Honduras (Porfirio Lobo). This year, the supposed ideological shift should continue, many claim, with the election of Álvaro Uribe for a third term in Colombia, José Serra for a first term in Brazil, one of the many center-right candidates in Peru, anyone but Néstor Kirchner in Argentina, and the continuation of Mexico’s conservative government if (most believe the correct word is ‘when’) it is able to somehow start “winning” the war on its drug-oriented society. Latin America’s nascent ideological repositioning has led many prominent conservative voices in the U.S., notably Álvaro Vargas Llosa and Jackson Diehl, to distill what they see as a generational right-leaning wave to a singular element, the impetus behind the region’s votes thus far: the elections are a referendum on Hugo Chávez, his policies, and his legacy.1
For these North American-centric critics, the advent of Evo Morales in Bolivia, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, Mr. and Mrs. Kirchner in Argentina, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua in the past decade was inorganic and largely derived from Chávez’s corruptive influence on the region. Diehl proclaims, “Hugo Chávez’s ‘socialism for the 21st century’ has been defeated and is on its way to collapse.”2 Diehl’s soaring rhetoric evokes that of political commentators during the height of the Cold War, yet, throughout much of Latin America, a 21st century Cold War against Chávezian Socialism is neither burgeoning nor remotely eminent.
Elections take place in Latin America systematically and uneventfully. A contributing reason to the presumption that such elections produce dramatic tidal shifts in public opinion is the high turnout they generate. The 2008 presidential election in the United States produced a voter turnout of roughly 62 percent. Compared to previous elections that managed voter turnouts in the 50 to 55 percent range, the 2008 presidential election’s voter turnout was very high. In Latin America, voter turnout is traditionally much higher. In Chile, for example, voter turnout has traditionally been around 93 percent in the post-Pinochet era.3 What commentators like Mr. Diehl and Mr. Vargas Llosa confuse for social movements, public referendums, and sweeping judgments on another country’s leader, are merely the discreet ratification of leaders or parties already in power or the pacific introduction of oppositional figures or groups into the gubernatorial calculus.
An organic political movement in Latin America to the left, perhaps originating with the election of Chávez himself in 1998, highlighted the past decade, according to many liberal commentators. But, was this so-called movement any more ‘organic’ than the present movement to the right? It was ‘organic’ inasmuch as the constituents of formerly fascist-led countries decided not to continue with the status quo, namely in Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay. But it was far from a trend, with many countries in Latin America, whose recuperative efforts after military rule occurred earlier, electing conservative governments to power, including in Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Guatemala. Presently, the evidence to support the theory that Latin America’s political outlook is inching toward the right is scant and evidence against any sort of comprehensive movement abounds. On December 6th, 2009, Evo Morales, the indigenous, left wing ally of Chávez, was elected for a second term as the president of Bolivia with 63 percent of the vote. In El Salvador this past summer, Mauricio Funes of the left wing FMLN won the presidential election with an absolute majority.
Wishful thinkers may attempt to employ convenient sensationalism to describe the political climate in Latin America. However, politics in this region is not a function of a singular variable, identifiable as or represented by Venezuela’s president Hugo Chávez. Viewing Latin America so simply and unproblematically is, at best, as offensive as it is puerile. Moreover, against Mr. Diehl’s most ambitious expectations, the region’s so-called ‘tilt to the right’ is not a miracle prescription for instantaneous change in U.S.–Latin American relations. Indeed, it is something else, something subtly damaging: the theory that Latin America’s move right will instantly improve U.S.–Latin American relations will produce a placebo effect that will delay the ever-important self-scrutiny the U.S. has managed to postpone since the Monroe Doctrine in 1823.
Notes
1 Vargas Llosa, Álvaro. “Latin America’s Tilt to the Right.” RealClearPolitics 6 January 2010.
2 Diehl, Jackson. “How Hugo Chávez’s revolution crumbled.” The Washington Post 25 January 2010.
3 From, “Servicio Electoral: República de Chile” (www.servel.cl) and “Tribunal Calificador de Elecciones – Chile” (www.tribunalcalificador.cl).