By Bécquer Medak-Seguín
February 2010
For the casual observer, it may seem nonsensical that, to this day, Britain and Argentina fight over the rights to a sparsely populated island near Antarctica. The conflict over the islands the British call the Falklands and the Argentines call the Malvinas dates back to 1826, when Luis Vernet established a settlement on the island and later proclaimed himself governor. Since the end of the war that established British rule in 1833, the Falkland Islands have remained a British colony amidst Argentina’s attempts during the latter half of the twentieth century to establish sovereignty. The most recent Argentine military gesture famously resulted in the Falklands War (Guerra de las Malvinas) of 1982, where a 74-day undeclared war was decisively won by Margaret Thatcher’s Royal forces over junta dictator Leopoldo Galtieri’s Argentine military, thereby upholding the status quo ante bellum. The war led the British government to increase its military presence on the island and establish several new permanent bases to deter the Argentine government from any subsequent invasions.
This February, however, old tensions between Argentina and the United Kingdom have rekindled because of a British push toward oil exploration off the island’s coast. Argentina has made a strong political push to limit or control British drilling operations in the potentially rich seabed surrounding the South Atlantic islands. Argentina recently ordered all ships heading to the Malvinas through Argentine waters to officially seek permission first from Buenos Aires.1 The nation has also sought regional support from the Rio Group, an international organization of Latin American and Caribbean states that is an alternative to the United States-dominated Organization of American States. At the body’s summit, the nations unanimously condemned any drilling around the islands. Argentina’s Foreign Minister, Jorge Taiana, announced on February 21, “Argentina has made significant diplomatic advances among the 33 foreign ministers of Latin America and the Caribbean that strengthen our country [in the dispute].”2 On February 24, Taiana met with United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, calling the body he heads to interfere in the unilateral decisions Britain has made regarding the Malvinas issue.3
The two-pronged British response has come from ‘The Falkland Islands Association’ and the U.K.’s UN representative. The latter, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, reiterated the island’s sovereignty. “This position is underpinned by the principle of self-determination as set out in the UN Charter,”4 he cited. The vice-president of the Association, General Sir Peter de la Billiere, condemned protests in Buenos Aires by Falkland War veterans and issued Argentina a “hands-off” warning: “We did not lay down 255 lives just to give up and walk out a few years later,”5 he said. Depending on your perspective, this last comment by General Billiere is indicative of either an old, war hero’s nostalgic preoccupation with his own legacy or symptomatic of a nation’s determination to remain relevant in a globalized, postcolonial world.
Britain’s effort to maintain the Falklands under its commonwealth is not unlike its historical dealings with Hong Kong, Gibraltar, and Scotland. The United Kingdom, among other things, claims that it is honoring the self-determination rights of the islanders. One islander, Jan Cheek, went as far as saying, “it seems to many of us that Argentina is indulging in a little latter-day colonialism in ignoring out right to self-determination and seeking to make us a colony of Argentina.”6 This seemingly democratic and just approach to dealing with the sovereignty of the South Atlantic islands requires an asterisk that many nationalist British supporters of the status quo frequently omit. Between 1980 and 1981, the British government engaged in secret negotiations to persuade the islanders to accept a ‘leaseback.’ Under this proposition, islanders would retain British citizenship and would be given nominal sovereignty until the final handover of the islands to Argentina.7 The negotiations, however, did not result in any formal agreement and the British Nationality Act of 1981 eventually denied many of the islanders their citizenship. After the Falklands War, the U.K. amended the Act largely as an act of gratitude for their effort and right wing members of the House of Commons have given the islanders political and monetary support ever since.8 In Hong Kong, not once did the U.K. give the islanders a say in whether they wanted to become a part of China. In Gibraltar, the U.K. has yet to consider giving the Gibraltarians a say in whether they would like to remain a part of the British empire. Finally, in Britain, there is strong English opposition to allowing the Scottish people to even vote on whether they would like to continue their political marriage to England.
In Argentina, the issue over the Malvinas has historical roots entrenched in U.S. foreign policy. The Monroe Doctrine, enacted in 1823, was meant to deter all European re-colonization attempts in the Western Hemisphere, yet, when Britain invaded the Malvinas in 1833, the U.S. did not fulfill their brotherly promise to come to the aid of their fellow American countries. This historical legacy of U.S. diplomacy has festered in many Latin American governments and it is, in large part, the reason for the popularity of rhetorically deft, leftist political figures today, including Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, Evo Morales of Bolivia, and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua. Today, as President Christina Kirchner of Argentina calls for occidental support, the U.S. still decidedly remains neutral on a subject that suggests extreme partiality. The dispute, if it continues, will likely reach its finale at the UN or The Hague because, the U.S. aside, much of the world understands the extent to which establishing negotiations between Britain and Argentina is a symbolic victory for a more equal, political global playing field. For them, the issue regarding the Malvinas is not, as some British politicians have insinuated, a petty, neocolonial complaint; rather, it is a luxurious, post-imperial anachronism with the sole purpose of attempting to evoke the fear that once was felt upon hearing the phrase ‘British Armed Forces.’ The British occupation of the Malvinas is as unnecessary as it is contemptible, as antiquated as it is irrational, and as nostalgic as it is nonsensical.
Notes
1 France-Presse, Agence. “Argentina Seeks Backing in Falklands Dispute.” The New York Times 21 February 2010.
2 Ibid.
3 “Taina claims for Malvinas at UN.” Buenos Aires Herald 24 February 2010.
4 Carroll, Rory. “Argentina appeals to UN over Falkland oil drilling.” The Guardian 25 February 2010.
5 Ingham, John. “SAS Hero: We’ll Save Falklands.” UK Express 26 February 2010.
6 Warren, Michael. “Argentina presses UN in help for Falklands dispute.” The Washington Post 24 February 2010.
7 Freedman, Sir Lawrance. The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: The Origins of the Falklands War. London: Routledge, 2005. 113-123.
8 Jenkins, Simon. “The Falklands can no longer remain as Britain’s expensive nuisance.” The Guardian 25 February 2010.